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The theory of international regulatory competition' has emerged as the
strongest contemporary critique of the argument for free trade.2 According to
this critique, when capital, finished goods and services are relatively mobile
across national borders, regulatory authorities will be induced to compete for
scarce capital by lowering regulatory standards.3 This "race-to-the-bottom"
theory4 is a frequent theme advanced against the integration of markets, for
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McLean, Nell Newton, Richard Parker, Andreas Rendl and Joseph Weiler for their thoughtful
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' See generally, Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L J 2039 (1993). Even leading proponents of the international trading
system have warned that regulatory competition may lead to a diminution in environmental
standards. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992).
2 For a concise and intelligent defense of free trade see JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM
(1988). Though the idea of free trade certainly means different things to different people, the
unprecedented popularity of free trade at this historical moment is remarkable. No doubt Adam
Smith would be astonished by the enthusiasm for free trade and market economics, especially
among the formerly non-market economies and developing economies. After all, Smith, a
professor of moral philosophy, regarded political economy as an aspect of social policy, neither
more nor less important than morality or other aspects of social policy. See generally, Hugh G.J.
Aitken, The Economist's Way of Thinking, AMHERST 8, 10-11 (Spring 1987). For example,
Smith warned that where large numbers of workers would be displaced by free trade, "Humanity
may in this case require that freedom of trade should be restored only by slow graduations, and
with a good deal of reserve and circumspection." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 435 (1937). In this light, Adam Smith would likely
view with alarm the sudden and sweeping embrace of free trade in Eastern Europe. Jagdish
Bhagwati, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 28, 1994, at 39.
' Sociologist Saskia Sassen has shown that capital's mobility and its concentration in certain
urban financial centers has displaced high-wage manufacturing jobs with low-wage service jobs
intensifying both class and gender income disparities. SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF CAPITAL
AND LABOR 126-170 (1988).
4 Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1, 70-74 (1991); RAVI
BATRA, MYTH OF FREE TRADE 215-230 (1993); HERMAN E. DALY AND JOHN B COBB, FOR THE
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
example, through the European Union (EU)' and the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA), 6 and the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to
trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7
Advocates of both the free trade position and the regulatory competition
critique share an implicit premise that the state and the market are
autonomous. Legal scholars recognize that legal realism repudiated the
separation of the state and the market more than a half century ago.8 Yet, the
premise of an autonomous market persists in the trade debate. Understanding
the fallacy of market autonomy, we can begin to construct a different
paradigm to explain how the relationship between the state and the market
affects the outcome of economic integration or free trade.
COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY. THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 51-61 (1989). See Kenneth Berlin and Jeffery M. Lang, The New Trade
Policy Agenda, 16 THE WASH. Q, no. 35 (Autumn 1993); Jeremy Breacher, NAFTA: Right or
Wrong? It Will Send Jobs Across the Border, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1993 at 15. See also, Stephen
L. Kass and Michael B. Gerrard, Implementation of NAFTA, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 30, 1993, at 3;
Laurie Henderson and Patricia Walsh, Forging a Link: Two Approaches to Integrating Trade
and Environment, 20 ALTERNATIVES, no. 1, 30 (Nov. 1993).
' See EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1990); Scott C. Budlong, Article 130r(2) and the Permissibility of State Aids for Environmental
Compliance in the EC, 30 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L 431 (1992). See also, Single European Act of
1986, 30 OJ EUR COMM. (No. L 169) S (1987) (entered into force, July 1, 1987), reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 503, 515 (1986), Articles 130r-t.
For the sake of consistency and convenience, I have used the term "European Union" or "EU"
to refer to the institutions of the European Community, unless I am referring to the title of a legal
measure that pre-dates the Maastricht treaty. The precise usage of these terms is a subject of
contention and satire. See generally, Note on Post-Maastricht Terminology, I COMMON MKT. L,
REV. 4 (1994).
' See PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC., BRIEFING BOOK FOR 103RD CONGRESS - WHY VOTERS ARE
CONCERNED: ENVIRONMENTAL AND CONSUMER PROBLEMS IN GATT AND NAFTA (1993);
William P. Alford, Introduction: The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Need for
Candor, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 293 (1993); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, "Green" Language in the
NAFTA: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 27 THE INT'L LAW. 691 (Fall
1993); NAFTA Side Accord on Environment, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1536 Sept. 15, 1993.
' See Daniel C. Esty, GATTing the Greens: Not Just Greening the GATT, FOREIGN AFF. 32,
35 (Nov./Dec. 1993). World Trade Organization, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Tuesday, June 14, 1994, [Testimony by Ralph Nader] and Jeopardized by Gat - 100 U.S.
environmental laws, NY TIMES, June 27, 1994, at AI5 (advertisement).
8 The legal realists showed that the background norms that are required by any market - such
as private law rules about property, contract, fraud, competition - are the direct result of public
policy created and enforced by government. The market cannot exist in the absence of such
private law rules, and of course, not all market economies have the same private law rules. Rules
like strict liability, implied warranties, adverse possession, or detrimental reliance, can affect costs
of production and market prices just as much as other forms of public regulation of wages and
prices. By demonstrating how private law rules operated to structure and price transactions, the
legal realists were able to characterize state market intervention in the form of public regulation
as no different than the state's construction of the market through private law rules. Both private
law rules and public economic regulation represent public policy choices that can affect market
prices. In this way, the legal realists provided a justification for the increased role of government




The wide acceptance of the race-to-the-bottom credo may be explained in
part because of the risk of environmental degradation, the growing "green"
consciousness, and political influence of environmental, labor and human
rights groups. The race-to-the-bottom rhetoric is one of the most popular
strategies for attacking the international trade regime.9 For some, the implied
criticism of less developed countries by environmentalists also reflects
historical, racial or class biases against the southern hemisphere.1"
' As Paul Krugman has suggested, "If there were an Economist's Creed it would surely contain
the affirmations, 'I believe in the Principle of Comparative Advantage,' and 'I believe in free
trade.'" Paul Krugman, Is Free Trade Passk?, 1 J. ECON PERSP., 131 (1987). Yet, even
mainstream economists, including Krugman, have acknowledged problems inherent in the pure
theory of trade. See generally, STEPHEN D. COHEN, JOEL R. PAUL, AND ROBERT A. BLECKER,
UNDERSTANDING U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY, Chapter 2 (1995); DALY AND COBB, supra note
4, at 25-96. CHRIS EDWARDS, THE FRAGMENTED WORLD: COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE,
MONEY, AND CRISIS (1985). For example, empirical studies of the gains from trade have shown
that at least the static gains from trade are relatively small and may in the short-term be
outweighed by sunk costs in capital. See, e.g., ALAN V. DEARDORFF & ROBERT M. STERN, AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
(1979) (estimating the total welfare gain for the U.S. at less than one-tenth of one percent of U.S.
gross domestic product). But see, William A. Orme, Jr., Myths vs. Facts: The Whole Truths
About the Half-Truths, FOREIGN AFF. 2, 4 (Nov./Dec. 1993); B.J.M. Baron Van Voorst Tot
Voorst and J.S. Van Dam, Europe 1992: Free Movement of Goods in the Wider Context of a
Changing Europe, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 693 (1988); C.D. Ehlermann, The Internal Market
Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT L. REV. 361 (1987); William P. Alford,
Introduction: The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Need for Candor, 34 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 293 (1993).
Paul Krugman and others have suggested that marginal costs for some industries may decline
over time, creating the possibility of lowering costs of production by strategically deploying trade
barriers to protect home markets while exploiting open foreign markets. PAUL R. KRUGMAN,
MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING RETURNS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION,
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1985); PAUL KRUGMAN, (ED.), STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY
AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Paul Krugman ed. 1986). Other economists have
noted that the pure theory of trade ignores the higher marginal utility lost to individual wage
earners displaced by imports compared to the relatively small marginal utility gained by
individual consumers and other producers from increased trade. W.M CORDEN, TRADE POLICY
AND ECONOMIC WELFARE (1974). In addition, the pure theory of trade assumes that markets are
perfectly competitive. In fact, where imperfect competition occurs, because of monopolies or
oligopolies, for example, the price mechanism may not operate properly to signal competitive
advantage. Moreover, there are the risks of market failures, which occur most commonly where
external costs or benefits from particular productive enterprises are not internalized. BATRA, supra
note 4. The pure theory of trade may not fully account for the behavior of multinational
enterprises or governments and parastatal enterprises, which dominate the world economy. All of
this may explain why, contrary to Ricardo's premise of gains resulting from specialization, more
than one-half of all world trade consists of importing and exporting identical goods. Herman E.
Daly, The Perils of Free Trade, Sci, AM. 24, 25 (Nov. 1993).
10 Xavier Carlos Vasquez, NAFTA and Environmental Racism, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357
(Spring 1993). The environmental groups in the United States are not insensitive to this criticism.
According to Robert Housman, staff attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law
in Washington, D.C., environmental groups in fact took pains during the NAFTA debate in the
United States to tone down their rhetoric concerning environmental conditions in Mexico in
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Among both the elite proponents of free trade and its largely
disenfranchised critics, there is an implicit acknowledgement of some causal
relationship between economic integration and the necessity for states to lower
regulatory policies to keep jobs at home and prevent capital flight." Free trade
proponents typically minimize the threat by insisting either that the rising tide
of economic growth will make it possible for less developed countries to adopt
higher regulatory standards or that the whole question of regulatory policies is
exogenous.12
My purpose is not to debate the merits of free trade; rather, I am interested
in how both positions rely upon a common erroneous presumption about that
relationship. First, I will discuss how trade theory underlies the GATT rules
and national trading statutes. In particular, I will look at the idea of a "fair
price" which is implicit in the pure theory of trade and explicit in the unfair
trading rules. Second, I will show how regulatory competition theory derives
from the same autonomous market fallacy as the idea of a fair price. I will
focus my discussion of regulatory competition on an ongoing case study of
packaging waste regulations in the EU to illustrate that, contrary to the
theory, economic integration between states with different levels of regulatory
standards does not necessarily lead to a race-to-the-bottom. In fact, there has
been a rise in packaging waste regulations in the EU at both the national and
the EU level as a result of economic integration. Since regulatory competition
theory is based on the false premise of market autonomy, it does not
adequately predict the outcome for legislative regulation when free trade
occurs.
deference to Mexican sensibilities. Many environmental groups, including Friends of the Earth
and Greenpeace, stress development issues in the third world.
"I For example, President Clinton insisted on negotiating an environmental side-agreement to
NAFTA to safeguard U.S. environmental standards from a race-to-the-bottom. See, Governor Bill
Clinton, Expanding and Creating American Jobs, Remarks by Governor William Jefferson
Clinton at North Carolina State University (Oct. 4, 1992).
" E.g. Geza Feketekuty, The Link Between Trade and Environmental Policy, 2 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 171, 179 (1993); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and the
Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86 AM. J INT'L L 700, 702 (1992). Some
economists suggest that trade also has the effect of rationalizing resource extraction based on the
availability of natural resources and thus minimize environmental damage associated with the
exploitation of natural resources. However, there are no empirical studies of this phenomenon. A
related defense of trade is that by expanding markets trade enables the development of new
technologies that require large economies of scale and which may increase productivity. Increased
productivity may be associated with reducing the marginal environmental damage from increased
production. R. Kaufmann, P. Pauly, and J. Sweitzer, The Effects of NAFTA on the Environment,
ENERGY J. 124, 130-133 (1993). This argument is also difficult to prove empirically and does not




I. THE FREE TRADE ARGUMENT
A. The Liberal Trade Constitution
Common to both the EU and the GATT are the principles of non-
discrimination and the reduction of barriers to trade within their respective
constituencies. Non-discrimination and the reduction of trade barriers underlie
the European Union's four freedoms of movement 1" and are ensured through
the expansive interpretive powers of the European Court of Justice. In the
GATT, the most-favored-nation" and national treatment 5 principles prevent
discrimination against other GATT members, but allow an important
exception for free trade areas and customs unions,'6 like the EU.
These principles form an implied constitution of the liberal trade order.'
7
While these principles are often qualified and are sometimes in conflict, they
are fundamental to structuring trade relationships among the majority of the
world's countries. If there is a bias against domestic regulation in the liberal
trade order, the bias can be located among these constitutional principles
which rest on the assumption that market forces should be allowed to operate
with minimal interference by government.
Of course, the market assumption derives from the pure theory of trade:
where relative prices would differ in the absence of trade, some countries can
gain, and none will lose, from trading at some intermediate world price.
Moreover, according to Ricardo, natural market forces will lead countries to
specialize in the production and sale of goods in which they enjoy a
comparative advantage, meaning that they are relatively less inefficient in the
production of one good than in the production of another good.'8 The true
genius of the pure theory of trade is that it demonstrates that every country
enjoys some comparative advantage. By exploiting comparative advantage no
country will be worse off and the world as a whole will be better off, according
to the theory. Trade usually entails some adjustment costs, (including
unemployment, sunk capital, and associated social problems), as resources
shift from one industry to another which enjoys a comparative advantage.
Despite these adjustment costs, there will be a net gain in world welfare if
resources shift toward the comparatively advantaged industry, Of course, the
shift in resources occurs correctly only if the price signals are functioning
properly; that is, relative prices must reflect the actual costs of production in a
" These are the movement of goods, services, workers and establishments. TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, March 25, 1957, Articles 7, 30, 48, 52 and 59, 298
U.N.T.S 11, [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME].
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts.
5, 6, T.I.A.S. no. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, as amended and in force on January 1, 1994, BISD Vol.
IV, [hereinafter GATT] Article I.
11 GATT Article III.
16 GATT Article XXIV.
'7 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, Part 1 (1988).
1S DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, ch. 7 (1971).
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competitive market. If prices are distorted, resources may move to a
comparatively disadvantaged industry, which may result in a net loss of world
welfare. 19
B. The Normal Price
Thus, the liberal trading order is preoccupied with the concept of a "fair
price" that will signal to producers and consumers what to buy from whom."
If the price signal is distorted either by private or public entities it will cause
the market to miscalculate comparative advantage so that trade may lead to a
reduction in welfare. The central tools for policing prices under the liberal
trade constitution have been antidumping and countervailing duties.
Antidumping duties are imposed to prevent imports from being sold below
the "normal value" or "fair price". 1 Sales below the normal value are
11 Ricardo assumed that comparative advantage was immutable based on the available labor
and capital. According to Ricardo, capital remained fixed in one country. The rapid mobility of
capital in the contemporary global market calls into question a fundamental assumption of
Ricardo's pure theory of trade. DALY AND COBB, supra note 4, chapter 11. The increased mobility
of capital points out the "constructed" comparative advantage that countries may gain from
regulatory conditions that favor capital.
2" The idea that government regulators can determine the "normal" or "fair price" of a good or
service that would prevail in the absence of government intervention, may derive from the early
development of utility rate regulation or competition law. This idea has been attacked by at least
three critiques in U.S. law. First, it was rejected as overly vague, requiring parties, according to
Justice Holmes, to guess at the risk of indictment, "what would have been the price in an
imaginary world." International Harvester Co. of America v. Commonwealth, 234 U.S. 216, 222
(1914). See generally, James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional or Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 495,
541-592 (1987). Second, the normal or fair price was attacked as a logical tautology: the actual
value of a utility's property, for example, was itself a function of a court's decision. Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L REV. 809, 817-818
(1935). Third, where the social costs or benefits of a good diverge from the private costs or
benefits, the price of that good will not reflect its actual cost or value in the absence of a tax or
subsidy. A. C PIGou, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-196 (1932). Strangely, the first two critiques
of a normal price have been largely overlooked by conventional economists. Here's how one of the
leading economics texts introduces the theory of price: "Price is defined as what is given in
exchange for a good or service. When the forces of supply and demand are permitted to operate
freely, price measures scarcity. As such, prices are a thing of beauty to economists, for they
convey critical economic information." JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 84 (1993). In George
Stigler's classic work on price theory, he omits any mention of the relationship between market
price and government. In his discussion of labor, for example, he fails to note how laws governing
hours, wages and collective bargaining may affect labor costs. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE 187-203 (1952). This evidence suggests that the work of the legal realists, like Cohen,
challenging the market's autonomy, did not permeate the economics literature.
1 GATT, Article 6; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (1994), BISD vol. IV [hereinafter GATT Code on Dumping]; Council
Regulation 2423/88 on protection against dumping or subsidizing imports from countries not
members of the European Economic Community, 1988 O.J. (L209) I, [hereinafter EC Reg.
2423/881; Tariff Act of 1930, §731 et seq.
GATT Dumping Code Article 2.1, and E.C. Reg. 2423/88 Article I(B) define "normal value"
substantially the same as U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 §773 defines "foreign market value." I am using
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presumptively "unfair". In order to discourage such practices, the GATT
permits parties to levy antidumping duties on the difference between the
actual price of the import and the fair price. Depending upon the availability
of data and how accurately the price reflects the costs of production, the fair
price is variously calculated either by reference to (1) the home market price,
(the price at which the good is sold in the ordinary course of business in the
home country of the exporter), (2) the price at which the good is sold for
export to some third country, or (3) the "constructed value," representing the
cost of production plus an imputed profit margin. The cost of production
includes the estimated costs of all physical inputs and labor necessary to
process the final product in the exporter's home country. Where prices of
inputs in the exporter's home country are not reliable, (for example, in a non-
market economy), the prices may be calculated based upon prices in a
surrogate country at the same level of development.
The exporter's costs of complying with domestic regulation in the home
market are implicitly included in calculating the fair price. Significantly,
however, the importing country's costs of regulatory compliance for its
domestic import-competing producers are excluded in calculating the fair
price. These compliance costs, such as the cost of pollution controls,
occupational safety, health insurance for workers, or consumer protection,
certainly affect the costs of import-competing producers. Yet, it is not
considered an unfair advantage for exporters to be able to produce without the
same compliance costs as their import competitors. By excluding the costs of
regulatory compliance in the importing country from the calculation of a fair
price, these costs are treated as presumably "abnormal" or "unnatural."
It may appear logical that a fair price for a good is one that takes into
account the impact of the exporter's government on the price of an export, but
excludes the impact of the importer's government on the price of an export.
That logic is undermined by the treatment of government subsidies under the
GATT, however. Under certain circumstances, GATT permits an importing
country to levy countervailing duties on imports in the net amount of subsidies
paid on production or export of such goods.2  Though historically
countervailing duties have been employed more often in the United States
than in the European Union, they are an important tool for disciplining import
prices that would otherwise be distorted by certain forms of subsidies. Under
the GATT, domestic subsidies and export subsidies for agricultural products
are allowed,2" but all export subsidies for secondary products are prohibited,
except in certain cases for developing countries. Both domestic and export
subsidies on primary and secondary products may be subjected to
countervailing duties, however. The 1994 GATT Code on Subsidies contains
the terms "normal price" and "fair price" as synonymous with "normal value" or "foreign market
value."
22 GATT Article 6; Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994), BISD vol. IV, Article 10
[hereinafter GATT Code on Subsidies]; E.C. Reg. 2423/88; Tariff Act of 1930 §303, 701 et seq.
11 GATT Code on Subsidies, Article 3.
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examples of domestic subsidies and an illustrative list of export subsidies,2'
which is incorporated by reference into the national laws of the contracting
parties. 26 Thus, government programs that benefit all or most producers (like
highways, public education, sewers, police protection or tax credits for
investment) are not countervailable. Additionally, taxes paid by producers to
support government services and cash outlays, including government subsidies,
are not included as a cost of production in calculating the import's fair price.
Implicit then in the countervailing duty laws is a structure limiting the scope
of a government's intervention in the economy. When the government intrudes
too far into the private economy, the result may be a countervailable subsidy.26
Both dumping laws and countervailing duty laws are premised on an idea
that government's role in the economy is limited and that prices should be set
according to certain criteria that exclude the costs in the importing country's
market of government regulation or the benefits of government programs.
These rules may be seen as somewhat arbitrary and ideological. For example,
assume the European Union required employers to meet certain environmental
requirements raising production costs by $1.00 per widget. Widgets imported
from Brazil sell for less than European produced widgets. In determining a
normal value or fair price for Brazilian widgets, the Commission would
consider the wholesale price for which widgets are sold for consumption in
Brazil, or it might construct a value based on the estimated cost of materials
and labor in Brazil plus a fair profit margin. In either case, the Commission
would not consider the cost of environmental compliance in the EU as a
"normal" cost of production in calculating a fair price for Brazilian widgets. If
the EU sought to offset that additional cost of compliance with a special $1.00
grant for every widget manufactured or exported, that grant would probably
constitute a countervailable subsidy. Yet, if the EU repealed the requirement
or exempted widget producers, the elimination of the regulatory cost probably
would not constitute a subsidy to be countervailed against by an importing
country. 27 From this example we see that the liberal trading system operates
"4 GATT Code on Subsidies, Article 1.1. and Annex I.
" There are almost no precedents for countervailing against domestic subsidies in EU law. Ivo
VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRAN;OIs BELLIs, ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION LAWS OF
THE EEC 271-272 (2d ed. 1990). In the U.S., domestic subsidies are countervailable only if given
to specific industries or enterprises. Tariff Act of 1930, § 771(5)(A)(ii). Domestic subsidies that
are "generally available" to all industries are not countervailable under U.S. law presumably
because all goods may benefit from some form of benefits derived from government - such as
police protection, public highways, government-funded research or state universities - and
otherwise could be subject to countervailing duties. See generally, Cabot Corp. v. U.S., 620 F.
Supp. 722 (CIT 1985).
26 Ironically, because generally available domestic subsidies are not countervailable, broader
government intervention may in fact be more intrusive in distorting market prices, but it will not
result in a countervailing duty. In the extreme case, exports from a non-market economy are not
subject to any countervailing duties, because prices in a non-market economy bear no relation to
actual production costs in a market economy. See, Georgetown Steel Corp. v U.S., 801 F.2d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
27 See, MX-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 1018 (1973), 44 F.R. 22,052
(1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 58,517 (1979).
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to discourage government intervention in the market. If the United States
requires specialty steel manufacturers to adhere to a higher level of pollution
controls than the EU requires of European specialty steel producers, and as a
result the relative price of specialty steel is less in the EU, the EU specialty
steel producers enjoy a comparative advantage that is "constructed" by
government policy. European specialty steel manufacturers are not compelled
to internalize the social costs of their pollution, and consequently, competitive
pressures on the U.S. specialty steel manufacturers may lead them to either
shutdown their U.S. plants or to lobby U.S. regulators for lower environmental
standards.2"
Dumping duty laws and countervailing duty laws work in concert to police
the borders of the state in the economy. Together they implicitly define our
image of the appropriate role the state may play in the economy. According to
the GATT, the state as builder of highways, enforcer of private property
rights, policer of the securities markets, and educator of children is tolerated;
the state as architect of economic growth, as creditor to industry or as
guardian of the ecosystem, is suspect.29
Can the liberal trade constitution's conception of a normal price be
defended by arguing that it relies on fundamental market realities by
excluding costs and benefits derived from government? In other words, is the
idea of a fair price one which is solely determined by the market without
regard for government intervention? The question itself reveals a critical
assumption: that the market and the state are autonomous. The separation of
the private market and the public law was repudiated by the legal realists in
U.S. domestic law." Yet, the separation of public and private retained its
vitality in international legal thought; indeed, it is the foundation for the
institution of private international law."1 If the market can determine price
28 Kaufmann et al., supra note 12, at 127-28.
29 GATT allows state parties to take limited safeguard measures in certain circumstances to
protect public morals, human, animal and plant life or health, artistic and historical treasures, and
exhaustible natural resources, among other things. GATT, Article XX. To some extent, the
capacity of state parties to employ such safeguards has been further restricted by the GATT
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, reprinted in (1994), BISD vol. IV, and the WTO.
30 The separation of public and private law was repudiated by the legal realists in U.S.
domestic law. E.g. Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, CORNELL L Q. 8 (1927); R.L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q 470 (1923). See
generally. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349 (1982); Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L REV. 1423 (1982); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 152-153 (1984). Legal realism did
not collapse the public/private distinction in international law as it did in municipal law. Realists
like McDougal and Lasswell worked to strengthen the nascent institutions of international law. In
doing so, ironically they reinforced the public/private distinction they had challenged
domestically.
"' See, Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 Wis. INT'L LJ. 149, 155-
164 (1988); Karen Engel, Views from the Margins: A Response to David Kennedy, UTAH L. REV.
(1993). Cf. David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIs. INT'L L.J
1, 3-7 (1988) (arguing that international law was untouched both by legal realists' private law
critique in the early part of the century and by the expansion of the public sector that followed the
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autonomously, then the liberal trade constitution's reliance on a fair price is
justifiable. Whether the market can determine price autonomously is the
question I turn to next.
C. Islands in the Stream
Often the relationship between national regulations and commerce is
described as if the market were the neutral or natural condition against which
all state action or regulation occurs as an unnatural intrusion or distortion.
The four freedoms of movement enshrined in the EC Treaty, 2 the principle of
non-discrimination" and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in the
GATT3 4 represent the background assumption of market normalcy.35 Against
this background assumption national measures to protect the environment
appear as exceptions to the general rule of free movement.36
This way of describing the relationship between national law or state power
and the flow of international commerce has in another context been analogized
by Laurence Tribe to a Newtonian description of physical space." The
Newtonian assumption that physical space was an empty stage within which
forces like gravity acted on physical objects was challenged by Einstein's
theory of relativity. Einstein characterized space as one of the actors reacting
and acting upon other objects.38 Einstein theorized that the earth revolves
about the sun like a marble rolling around the sides of a bowl, because of the
curve of the space within which the earth orbits. Professor Tribe suggests that
just as space cannot be distinguished from the objects moving within it, by
analogy "the law cannot extract itself from social structures."3  Borrowing
from Professor Tribe's analogy, a more modern view of the global market
would characterize it both as the consequence of state power and as a primary
actor in shaping the policies and behavior of states.
New Deal). According to Kennedy, public international law was marginalized as private
international law was absorbed into municipal law. Id. at 5.
32 TREATY OF ROME, Articles 30, 48, 52 and 59.
" GATT, Articles I and III.
" GATT, Article XI.
"' See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100
HARV. L. REV. 546 (1987) (describing market correction and adjustment laws as based on
"normal" laissez-faire assumptions).
36 TREATY OF ROME, Article 36; GATT, Article xx.
17 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1983). Professor Tribe described Einstein's
contribution to our understanding of physical space as a shift from a paradigm in which space was
seen as a uniform background, to a paradigm in which space is seen as non-uniform and just as
much a part of the foreground as the physical objects within it. Id. at 6. Professor Tribe showed
that the Newtonian conception of space as flat, empty background "parallels the legal paradigm in
which state power, including judicial power, stands apart from the neutral, 'natural' order of
things." Id. at 7.
38 A. EINSTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY (5th ed. 1956) at 140, as cited by Tribe, supra
note 37.
39 Id. at 7.
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The assumption of market normalcy is implicit in the European Court of
Justice's landmark judgment in Dassonville."° The Court's judgment treated
the market as the normal or natural state which exists prior to the distortion
of national laws. According to the Dassonville judgment, all national trading
rules capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade
between Member States constitute measures having equivalent effect to
quantitative restrictions and are prohibited by Article 30 of the Treaty. The
Court acknowledged that certain of the Member States' mandatory rules to
achieve specified objectives could be tolerated on non-economic grounds if
proportional, reasonable, and non-arbitrary, but the free movement of goods
remained the background assumption against which all state action is judged.
The development of Dassonville's rule of reason signalled the impossibility
of separating the unnatural politicized phenomenon of state power from the
natural neutral background of the market. First, the Court clarified and
reinforced the rule of reason. In the Cassis de Dijon41 judgment, the Court
specified that the rule of reason only applied where no harmonization had
occurred under Article 100. The Court enumerated the permissible categories
of mandatory rules: fiscal policy, public health, fair trade, and consumer
protection.4 Subsequently, in the Danish Bottle judgment, the Court added
environmental protection to this list as a legitimate category for mandatory
requirements."3 Although the Court's judgment in the Danish Bottle case
struck down some aspects of Denmark's bottle law, it significantly
strengthened the capacity of Member States to legislate environmental
regulations in the absence of any harmonization measure, even where the
regulations created obstacles to free movement, so long as the regulations were
proportional and non-discriminatory." The conflict then between national
measures to protect the environment and the free movement of goods was
implicit from the start and was made apparent by the Court's developing
jurisprudence in this area.
40 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, E.C.R. 837, 2 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974).
41 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Branntwein, E.C.R. 649,
3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1978).
42 See generally, on the rule of reason, F. BUROws, FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 40-64 (1987); P.J.G KAPTEYN, P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, AND LAURENCE
W. GORMLEY, ed., INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AFTER THE
COMING INTO FORCE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 387-397 (2d. ed 1989); DERRICK WYATT
AND ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 127-146 (1987); LAURENCE W.
GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC: THE THEORY AND
APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 30-36 OF THE EEC TREATY (1985).
13 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, E.C.R. 4607, 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1988) [hereinafter
Danish Bottle].
'4 See Francis Cairncross, How Europe's Companies Reposition to Recycle, 70 HARV BUS
REV. 34, 35 (Mar.-April, 1992) (stating that Germany "rushed" to take advantage of the
precedent set by the Danish Bottle Case). See also, The Freedom to be Dirtier than the Rest:
Why Differing Environmental Priorities Cause Problems for Trade, THE ECONOMIST 4 (May 30,
1992) (describing how EC environmental legislation has focused upon the prevention of certain
countries gaining a competitive advantage by being dirtier than the rest).
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Each of these judgments appears as an island in the stream of commerce
gradually shifting and shaping the flow of goods. The Court acknowledges the
islands as exceptions to the stream, but it is undeniable that the islands shape
the stream just as much as gravity curves physical space. The most recent
island in the stream emerged in the Court's judgment in Keck."
5 There the
Court considered whether a French criminal law prohibiting the resale of
products in an unadulterated state below their actual purchase price violated
Article 30. The Court stressed that a national restriction on resale below cost
is not intended to restrict movement of goods between Member States. The
restriction on free movement is merely incidental. The Court concluded that
national provisions applied uniformly to all traders within the national
territory restricting certain selling arrangements with the same legal effect on
domestic and foreign products were permitted by Article 30.
The Court's focus on the intent of the legislation and the absence of any
facial discrimination represents a significant shift away from the assumption
of market normalcy in Dassonville. In Keck, the Court itself pointed out that
it felt compelled to cut back on Dassonville's broad language "[i]n view of the
increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 30 of the Treaty as a means of
challenging any rules whose effect was to limit their commercial freedom even
where such rules were not aimed at products from other Member States."'4 e In
essence, the Court shifted from an effects test to an intent test for regulations
that are not product-related and non-discriminatory. So long as the state does
not intend to interrupt commerce, but acts for a legitimate reason, the national
measure is justified, in the absence of any harmonization measure."7 This shift
in the relative position of European Union law and national law may be
defended as a recognition of the risk of a downward spiral in regulatory
competition and the necessity for establishing minimal national standards.'8
By preserving the national sphere and enlarging it, the Court arguably
shifted the stream of free movement, blurring the categories of permissible
national measures; islands have turned into marshland. The classical view of
"8 B. Keck and D. Mithouard Preliminary Ruling, Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, 24 Nov.
1993, [1993] E.C.R. (not yet reported), as reported in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF
JUSTICE Week of 22 to 26 November 1993, no. 33-93.
I d. at 5.
'7 See Ludwig Kramer, Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30 COMMON
MKT L REV 111 (1993); P. Kromarek, Environmental Protection and the Free Movement of
Goods: The Danish Bottles Case, 2 J ENVT'L L 89 (1990); P. Sends, European Community
Environmental Law: Legislation, the European Court of Justice and Common-Interest Groups,
53 THE MODERN L REV. 685, 696-697 (1990); George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity
Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM L REV.
332 (1994).
" See Kramer, supra note 47, at 120-127; Bermann, supra note 47, at 401-403. It is unclear
how the judgment of Keck would apply in the environmental area. The Court limited the scope of
Keck in Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estee Lauder
Cosmetics GmbH, Case C-315/92 (2 Feb. 1994). In Clinique, the Court ruled that Article 30
precluded a German law prohibiting the import of a product classified as a cosmetic under the
name "Clinique" as misleading. The Court found that Keck was inapplicable to regulations on
products, as opposed to "selling arrangements."
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national regulation threatened by the stream of free movement is fundamental
to the jurisprudence in this area. As the Court has sought to mediate this
conflict, the relationship between European Union law and national law has
been redefined as a question of "subsidiarity" rather than supremacy. 9
D. Conclusion
The liberal trade constitution derives from the pure theory of trade. At its
core is the concept of a normal or fair price that signals to consumers and
producers what to consume and produce. This economic concept is explicit in
the unfair trade laws and the definition of a normal value. The normal value
includes the costs of inputs and labor necessary for producing a good as well
as a fair profit margin, but it excludes costs associated in the importing
country with compliance with government regulation. As a result, there is a
strong bias against regulation inherent in the unfair trade laws. Moreover, the
trade laws falsely assume that it is possible to segregate out the effect of
governmental institutions or public law from the behavior of market actors. I
have suggested that this view corresponds with a Newtonian view of space.
Dassonville and its progeny teach us that it is impossible to look at the market
or the state in isolation from the other.
Just as the case for free trade derives from the autonomous market fallacy,
so, too, the critics' response that free trade leads to a regulatory race-to-the-
bottom derives from the same wrong assumption. If the market's autonomy
leads us to a false concept of a normal price, it may also lead us to a false
conclusion about the behavior of competing market actors in a situation where
goods and capital are mobile, and regulatory standards vary across
international borders.
II. REGULATORY COMPETITION
A. The Regulation of Waste Packaging
One dramatic example of the interaction of state and market actors raising
environmental standards is in the area of regulating packaging waste. The EU
produces more than 108 million tons of solid waste annually. Solid waste
represents two forms of environmental injury. First, it wastes virgin resources,
including trees, metals, and petroleum. Second, waste disposal by dumping or
incineration is a continuing source of damage to soil, air, water and the health
of plants, animals and humans. In the EU, about one-half of all solid waste,
" As Professor Bermann has suggested, the concept of subsidiarity should be viewed as a
procedural mechanism favoring democratic pluralism and national autonomy rather than a
substantive rule. Bermann, supra note 47. To the extent that Professor Bermann's conception of
subsidiarity succeeds in strengthening autonomy, the islands in the stream may come to resemble
more an archipelago expanding the reserved domain of national autonomy. This article is
consistent with Professor Bermann's general preference for greater democracy and autonomy
within the European Union, but suggests a more organic, less predictable relationship between the
reserved domain and the stream of free movement.
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more than 50 million tons annually, is caused by packaging. Of that amount,
the EU recycles less than 20 percent. The bulk of all packaging waste, 60 to
80 percent depending upon the member state, is dumped in landfills. The
remainder is incinerated." Paper packaging waste alone fills almost 20 percent
of new landfill sites and plastic packaging fills another 12 percent. If these two
sources of waste could be eliminated, it would be equivalent to saving one-
third of all new landfills. 1
Landfills adversely affect the environment in numerous ways. Landfills
permanently eliminate space from other productive uses, the seepage of the
waste into water tables can contaminate surrounding soil and water supplies,
and decaying solid waste produces methane gas that can cause health hazards,
noxious fumes, damage to vegetation and even explosions. Throughout Europe,
and especially in countries like Germany and the Netherlands, available
landfill sites are growing scarce.52 Yet, dumping remains a relatively
inexpensive form of disposal for solid waste.53
Incineration, the second most common form of disposal, also has adverse
environmental and health effects. Incineration produces toxic gases such as
dioxins and hydrogen chloride, which can damage plant, animal and human
health. To avoid dioxins, incinerators must operate at very high temperatures,
which consume significant amounts of energy, and must be equipped with
scrubbers, which are not always available or economical. Certain plastics when
burned cause hydrochloric acid which can destroy vegetation and pollute the
air and water. Finally, incinerators spew a variety of air-born pollutants,
including carcinogens. 5' To avoid this Hobson's choice between dumping and
" Teresa Reeves, Packaging Waste in Europe.- Confrontation or Cooperation?, THE
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Special Report no. R553, at 4-6 (March, 1993) [hereinafter
EIU Special Report].
11 For information on the impact of waste regulations, see Cooper and Lybrand, EEC
COMMENTARIES. ENVIRONMENT (1994) section 9.
52 According to the German State Secretary in the Environment Ministry, all Germany's large
landfills will be filled to capacity within ten years. Ferdinand Protzman, Germany's Push to
Expand the Scope of Recycling, N.Y TIMES, July 4, 1993, §3, at 8.













Source: National Solid Waste Management Association, 1990
EIU Special Report, supra note 50, at 43-46. Serious questions can also be raised about the]
environmental costs of recycling in some situations. Recycling often requires large amounts of
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incineration, some authorities, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands,
have exported solid waste to neighboring European countries or to developing
countries in Africa. Exporting environmental hazards has led to increasing
political tensions inside and outside the EU.55
Packaging waste is a classic example of market failure where the price of
packaging does not internalize the social cost of the waste and the cost of
dumping or incinerating packaging waste does not internalize the social cost to
the environment. One way an economist might conceptualize the social cost of
environmental damage would be to imagine some measure of the social value
that the environment serves. The environment has the capacity to regenerate
natural resources over time, including plants, animals and minerals, which are
often required for production. Second, it removes and recycles waste products
and impurities generated by human civilization. Third, the environment can
influence climate conditions which may affect human health and welfare.
Finally, the environment affects and renews the human spirit, affecting social
behavior in a myriad of subtle and overt ways. These four functions can be
described as naturally occurring "services" provided by the environment.""
In the economist's view, the market for waste fails to adequately price the
value of this environmental service. The service performed by the environment
is a "pure public good," meaning it is freely accessible to everyone, and it
would be practically impossible to exclude anyone from using these
environmental services. The economist argues that the role of government is to
internalize the social cost of packaging waste either through a tax or
regulation so that the market operates more efficiently. In addition, or in the
alternative, the economist might argue that the market value of packaging
waste does not adequately reflect the social benefit of recycling waste rather
than using virgin materials. Even if the supply of waste for recycling
increased, the cost of recycled materials would probably remain high because
of the expense of collecting, sorting and processing packaging waste. So an
economist might conclude that a related objective of regulation would be to
subsidize the price of the recycled material or mandate demand for it. If either
the price of dumping were increased to reflect the fair value of these
environmental services or the social benefit of using recycled material was
reflected in the lower price of recycled material, the private market would
produce the optimal amount of pollution, according to conventional micro-
economic analysis. 7
water for cleaning and energy for transporting waste long distances and then converting waste to
recyclable material. Single-, Multiple-use Plastic Packaging being Compared in Research on
Recycling, Int'l Env. Daily (BNA), Aug. 11, 1993. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that on balance
recycling and re-use of waste packaging is less costly on average to the environment of most
industrialized countries than landfills or incineration.
" See generally, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, reproduced in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
" See, Kaufmann, et al., supra note 12, at 126-128.
5' The optimal amount of pollution constitutes the point at which the marginal loss of value
from the diminution in environmental services associated with increased economic activity is equal
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This economic perspective may be useful to frame the regulatory objectives:
taxing the producer of waste for the social cost and subsidizing the recycler for
the social benefit they perform. In actual practice, however, the cost-benefit
analysis cannot neutrally determine the correct "price" the market should
charge. 8 The varied and powerful critiques of cost-benefit analysis exceed the
scope of this paper, but two central problems are the methodology for
determining the correct price and the maximization of social utility or welfare.
First, the social cost or benefit may be priced differently depending upon
whether one relies on the offering price or the asking price. For example, if the
manufacturer has a right to dump waste, a homeowner located adjacent to a
landfill site might be able to offer $1,000 to be free from the noxious fumes
and eyesore; but if the homeowner has the right to prevent the manufacturer
from dumping, she would probably ask for much more than $1,000 from the
manufacturer in exchange for giving the manufacturer the right to dump
waste near her property line. The price differential may reflect differences in
income level; relatively poor parties might offer to pay less than what they
would ask for if they were selling the same good. Or the price differential
might result from the observed tendency of most individuals to value what
they have more than what they might gain. Second, even if it were possible to
determine the correct price, it would tell us nothing about the marginal gain in
welfare or utility experienced by a consumer when a manufacturer ceases to
produce a non-recyclable plastic container. In general, individuals will value a
scarce good more than an abundant good. Individuals living in a densely
populated area with few landfill sites may experience a greater marginal
benefit from each non-recyclable plastic container held off the market than the
manufacturer, even if the latter is able to pay a higher price for the right to
produce packaging waste. Optimizing income does not necessarily optimize
welfare, if losers value their marginal loses more than the winners value their
marginal gains.
to the marginal gain in value from the increased economic activity. If the marginal loss of value is
greater than the marginal benefit of economic activity, then it is sensible to reduce the level of
economic activity to raise welfare. Alternatively, if the marginal benefit is higher than the
marginal cost, the economic activity should be expanded to maximize human welfare. Id. at 126-
128. For a good discussion of alternative methods of pricing resources and determining the costs of
pollution, see DAVID PEARCE, BLUEPRINT FOR A GREEN ECONOMY (1992); Robert Housman,
Making Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing: A Kantian Approach, 49
WASH & LEE L REV. 1373 (1992); Robert Housman and Durwood J. Zaelke, Forging
Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENVT'L. L 545 (1993).
8 Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387 (1981) (arguing that the concept of efficiency is indeterminate without reference to
political values). But see, Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L REV. 1169 (1984) (countering that it is still
possible to apply cost-benefit analysis using neutral principles).
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B. National Measures to Regulate Packaging Waste
EU Member States have adopted a variety of strategies in response to the
social externalities generated by packaging waste. Most Member States have
relied upon measures intended to drive down the cost of recyclable waste and
to hold manufacturers, and indirectly consumers, responsible for the additional
social costs of packaging waste. These national measures have had two
consequences. First, the effect of subsidizing recyclable waste in some
countries has created competitive pressure on private market actors in other
countries to support equivalent national packaging regulation. Second, the
threat that national measures could create barriers to the free movement of
goods across the EU, has compelled the Commission to react with a proposal
of its own to harmonize the national systems at a higher level of packaging
regulation than had previously existed in most of the EU.
The Netherlands and Germany have two of Europe's most comprehensive
environmental programs, and both are particularly concerned with the
problem of waste disposal. Since the problem of packaging waste is associated
with consumerism, it may be natural that the concern is greatest in those
countries that enjoy the highest standard of living, and which therefore
generally consume the greatest volume of packaging per capita.? Moreover,
these countries enjoy the financial means to ameliorate the situation. Steps to
regulate packaging waste were first initiated in the Netherlands, Germany,
Denmark, and Italy with the intention of both limiting the production of
packaging waste and promoting the recovery of waste material.8"
i. The Netherlands
Beginning in the early 1980s the Dutch Government embraced the concept
that manufacturers and distributors should be responsible for the whole
lifecycle of a product from cradle-to-grave. The lifecycle concept, derived from
Packaging Waste












Sources: 1) Centre Francais du Commerce Ext6rieur (CFCE) as reported to
EIU Special Report No. R553 supra note 50, at 2; WORLD BANK. WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992 (1992).
60 This survey of Member States is not intended to be exhaustive.
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the "polluter pays" principle, was endorsed by the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 61 This revolutionary concept posited
that the producer or distributor should bear at least some responsibility for the
waste created by a product. Here we have an example of the state imposing on
private producers the obligation to collect and dispose of waste. The lifecycle
concept privatized the traditionally public function of waste disposal, while at
the same time it imposed public obligations on private actors. In this sense, the
lifecycle concept challenged the public/private frontier.
In June 1991, Minister Alders concluded the Covenant on Packaging with
the Stichting Verpakking en Milieu (the "Foundation for Packaging and the
Environment")." The Covenant was written as a legally enforceable contract
between the government and the Foundation representing the "packaging
chain," including manufacturers and distributors involved with producing or
using packaging or packaged products and recyclers of packaging. The
Covenant was intended to eliminate all dumping of packaging waste by the
year 2000, and it contained both qualitative and quantitative objectives. The
qualitative provisions call on producers to avoid packaging materials that are
harmful to the environment, such as dyes containing heavy metals, lead
closures on bottles, polyvinyl chloride, and bleaches. These provisions also
encouraged manufacturers to use plastics and bottles that could be more easily
recycled or re-used. The quantitative provisions set out a schedule to reduce by
the year 2000 the weight of packaging by at least ten percent of the total
weight produced in 1986 for each form of packaging material. The packaging
chain promised to develop new forms of packaging that require less materials
and to avoid excess packaging. In addition, the packaging chain agreed to
minimize by year 2000 the use of materials that damage the environment,
such as additives, non-recyclable plastics, lead tops, and paints, to use re-
usable packaging to the extent feasible, and to recycle at least 60 percent of
used packaging which cannot otherwise be re-used. The agreement provided
that 80 percent of non-reusable glass, 60 percent of cardboard packaging and
50 percent of plastics would be recycled by December, 1995. Moreover, the
packaging chain undertook to establish separate collection facilities for glass
and paper, to encourage retailers to adopt deposit and return programs for
packaging and to develop additional recycling capacity. In consideration for
the industry's commitments, the Dutch Minister of the Environment agreed to
issue regulations and to discuss implementation plans working closely with the
packaging chain. The Covenant also established a Committee of government
and industry representatives to monitor compliance with the Covenant's terms
and an arbitration procedure to handle disputes. Finally, the annex to the
61 The polluter pays principle states that polluters should bear the costs of pollution control,
which should be reflected in the costs of good and services, and should not benefit from
environmental subsidies that would distort trade. DAVID HUNTER, JULIA SUMMER AND SCOTT
VAUGHN. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION, 1994, p. 32 (monograph prepared for the United Nations Environmental
Programme).
6" The Covenant is on file with the Columbia Journal of European Law.
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Covenant contained a list of steps to be taken in one-to-two years to minimize
packaging. Examples of these measures include charging customers for
shopping bags in supermarkets, packaging detergents in compact containers,
eliminating unnecessary wrapping on pet food, reducing the weight of tinplate
in cans and of glass in jars, and making labels on glass jars more easily
removable.
It is still too early to assess how significantly the Dutch Covenant has
reduced packaging at its source. The packaging chain has succeeded in
establishing neighborhood collection facilities throughout the country. The
close relationship between the environment ministry and representatives of the
packaging industry has cultivated trust and a cooperative spirit. Many Greens
in the Netherlands are critical of the Covenant's gradual voluntary approach.
As a result, there is increased pressure to move faster on recycling packaging
waste, and in the EU, the Netherlands has been an insistent voice for tougher
packaging regulations. Members of the Dutch Parliament have called for an
eco-tax on excessive packaging and on dumping solid waste in landfills.
Opponents of the Covenant have argued that this is overly ambitious and that
the German packaging ordinance, discussed below, has generated additional
recyclable waste that exceeds both the capacity of recyclers and the market
demand for recycled material.
ii. Germany
At the same time that the negotiations over the Packaging Covenant were
being concluded in the Netherlands, the German Government approved an
ordinance to regulate packaging waste.6" The Greens had demanded action in
response to the disappearance of landfill sites, increased acid rain from the
incineration of polyvinyl chloride, litter, dioxins from bleached paper, and
wasted petroleum and timber. The packaging ordinance, often referred to as
the T6pfer law (named for the German Environmental Minister Klaus
Tdpfer), was a response to the political demands of the Greens, who had
reached 14 percent in the polls.64 The T6pfer law established a far more
comprehensive mandatory system than the Dutch Covenant to restrict the use
of environmentally unsafe materials in packaging, to minimize the use of
packaging and to provide for recycling facilities through the private sector.
The ordinance applied to any manufacturer of packaging or packaged
products or any distributor of packaging or packaged products.
In essence, the German law imposed a fundamental requirement on all
distributors and manufacturers to take back any packaging of the same kind
as manufactured or distributed by that party from any consumer, regardless of
63 Regulation on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste [Verpackungsverordnung - VerpackV of
12 June 1991] 31 I.L.M. 1135 (1992), effective 1 January 1993, repealing the Regulation on the
Taking Back of, and Charging Deposits on, Plastic Drinks Packaging of 20 December 1988
(Federal Law Gazette I p. 2455).
" Richard Calder, Avoid, Minimize. Re-use, Recycle: The German Packaging Ethic, 65 SOAP
PERFUMERY & COSMETICS, Oct. 1992, no. 10, p. 41.
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whether the consumer actually purchased the product from that party. Most
significantly, incineration and dumping of packaging waste were prohibited.
Manufacturers and distributors were required to provide for the re-use or
recycling of any packaging waste. Distributors of non-recyclable packaging for
beverages, detergents, spray paints and cleansers were required at every stage
of distribution to charge certain deposits to be reimbursed when the packaging
was returned.
Manufacturers and distributors were exempt from this burdensome "take-
back" obligation if they agreed to participate in an alternative private system
that provided for regular collection of packaging waste from consumers
subject to the regulation of the appropriate authorities of the individual
German states. To obtain approval by the state authority, the private system is
required to collect and recycle or re-use certain minimum percentages of glass,
tin, aluminum, cardboard, paper, plastic and compound packaging within each
state. To facilitate this ambitious parallel private system of waste collection
and recycling, the law allowed manufacturers and distributors collectively to
contract with third parties. Violations of the regulation were subject to fines as
an administrative offense.
Since January 1993, all of the German state authorities have approved a
single private alternative system called the Duales System Deutschland
("DSD"). Packaging waste from consumer products displaying a green dot
can be returned to DSD for recycling, re-use or disposal. By 1994, more than
80 percent of all consumer products displayed the green dot. For the right to
display the green dot, producers agree to pay a small fee determined by the
type and volume of packaging. These fees are passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices." DSD provides weekly home pick-up services
throughout the country for green dot packaging waste. Households are
expected to sort the waste by material into one of several colored plastic bags
provided for that purpose. DSD then delivers the packaging waste to recyclers
without charge, or to an increasing extent, DSD provides subsidies to recyclers
to defray the high cost of recycling certain material, especially plastics.
DSD began operations in July 1991, with the participation of more than 600
companies. German consumers responded to the recycling program
enthusiastically."6 By 1993, DSD reached virtually all German households and
was receiving as much as four times the amount of packaging waste it had
anticipated.6 7 Over 60 percent of household waste paper, 50 percent of glass,
40 percent of cans and 20 percent of plastic packaging were returned to
DSD." The unexpected and overwhelming participation by consumers vastly
66 One estimate is that consumers in Hamburg paid about US $9 more per pound of plastic
packaging in 1993. Arthur Allen, For Germans, Recycling too Fastidious for Country's Capacity,
CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1993, at 2N.
66 Ariane Genillard, Too Much of a Good Thing, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 1993, 18.
67 Waste Disposal, Chemical Firms Join Venture to Recycle Plastic Under 'Green Dot'
Scheme, Int'l Env. Daily (BNA), July 9 1993; Genillard, supra note 66, at 18.




exceeded Germany's capacity to recycle waste. For example, in 1993, DSD
collected 409,000 metric tons of plastic containers. Total recycling capacity for
plastic waste in Germany was only 124,000 metric tons.69 The surplus of
packaging waste precipitated a series of financial, diplomatic and legal
problems for DSD.
First, overwhelmed by more waste than it had the capacity to recycle within
Germany, DSD was compelled to store waste or pay recyclers to take waste off
its hands. At the same time, more than one-half of the firms utilizing the
green dot had failed to pay their fees to DSD. The unanticipated expenses of
transporting, handling, sorting and subsidizing the huge volume of packaging
waste, combined with the shortfall of fees, threatened DSD's financial solvency
with a DM500 million (US$290 million) debt70 and compelled DSD to raise
user fees on its green dot. By 1994, fees ranged from one to four pfennings
(half a cent to three cents) approximately per package depending on weight
and type of material.
Second, the spillover of packaging waste onto other countries hurt these
countries' industries and became a source of diplomatic embarrassment with
other Member States of the EU. On the one hand, the DSD provided German
recyclers with an abundant source of free or subsidized waste material. As a
result, paper millers and plastic manufacturers elsewhere in Europe
complained that the scheme unfairly advantaged German industry. For
example, by 1994, about one-half of all paper products in Germany were
manufactured from waste paper provided free by the DSD.7 1 On the other
hand, some German recyclers, paid by DSD for recycling waste, allegedly paid
foreign companies to take waste off their hands.7 2 DSD and its subcontractors
exported huge quantities of packaging waste to France, eastern Europe and
southeast Asia for dumping or for recycling in Britain, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. The infant recycling industries in
these countries were so flooded by subsidized German waste, that domestic




'9 Germany's Recycling Overfloweth, CHEMICAL WEEK, June 16, 1993, at 65.
70 Nao Nakanishi, Germany Rescues Ambitious Recycling Scheme from Scrapheap, THE
REUTER LIBRARY REP., Oct. 29, 1993; James 0. Jackson, World-class Litterbugs, TIME, Oct. 18,
1993, at 80; Rubbish, THE ECONOMIST, July 3, 1993, at 46.
71 John Eisenhammer, German Waste Drive Creates a Stink, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 17, 1994, 37.
Ann Kolik, German Programs Shed Light on Recycling Trends, WORLD WASTES, Apr. 1994, vol.
37, no. 4, 12.
72 According to some reports, German recyclers paid foreign companies up to DM600
(US$360) per ton. Ariane Genillard, Recycling has Neighbors Crying Foul - Complaints of
Cheap Waste Exports to European Countries, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at 6.
13 Alison Maitland, Germany Rebuts Criticism of its Waste Recycling Laws, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1993, at 3; Packaging Waste: UK Complains of German Recycling Scheme Spill-over, EUR
ENERGY, Oct. 1, 1993, no. 402. In France, for example, paper-makers received up to FF300 per
ton for accepting German waste paper. Paper-makers were therefore disinclined to purchase
French waste paper. The prices of French waste paper fell from FF90 to FF10 from 1992 to 1993.
In 1993, DSD exported 450,000 tons of waste paper to France. Packaging Waste: Recovery Loses
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Third, as DSD became a dominant force in the recycling industry, it
became embroiled in a number of legal challenges. The German Cartel Office
and the Commission initiated separate investigations of DSD for possible
violation of the German and EU competition laws. The German Cartel Office
was responding to complaints from paper recyclers that DSD was operating to
control the market by offering large subsidies to certain contractors. DSD
sought to reassure the Cartel Office that it would make subsidies available to
independent firms. Then the Cartel Office raised additional concerns about
DSD's plans to handle packaging waste from industrial and commercial
businesses, and it issued an order preventing DSD from entering this market,
which DSD appealed to a Berlin court.7 4 In 1993, the Frankfurt Public
Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation into allegations that DSD's
subcontractor for plastics, VGK GmbH, had defrauded DSD by simulating
recycling it did not perform. Documents indicate that plastic packaging waste
which VGK was paid to recycle ended up being dumped in France and eastern
Europe.7 5 Finally, the Commission announced in March 1994 that it was
initiating infringement proceedings against Germany for distortions to the
internal market resulting from the packaging law.
76
As a result of these financial, diplomatic and legal challenges facing the
packaging ordinance, the German Government is considering a range of
amendments relaxing the recycling targets, imposing an eco-tax to restrict
packaging at its source and requiring all packaging be marked to indicate
whether it is recyclable or returnable.
7 7
iii. France
The adoption of packaging recycling programs in the Netherlands and
Germany affected neighboring Member States, especially France, in three
respects. First, the Dutch Covenant and the German Packaging Ordinance
had a powerful demonstration effect. The Dutch and German commitment to
reducing packaging waste appealed to green parties throughout Europe.
Producers, retailers and packagers viewed with concern the potential
disruption in free movement from national packaging regulations. These
out to Eco-Tax Option, EUR. REP., June 24, 1993, no. 1869 [hereinafter Packaging Waste, EUR.
REP]. In October 1993 Germany pledged to cease exporting waste and to open two new recycling
plants for processing paper packaging waste. Seeing the Light at Last, 9 PACKAGING WEEK, Dec.
3, 1993, no. 25, at 25.
" Company Defends Waste Collection Scheme in Legal Opinion Filed with Cartel Office, Int'l
Env. Daily (BNA), June 17, 1993; FCO Bars Trash Hauler from Collecting and Disposing of
Transport Packaging, 65 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), July 22, 1993, no. 1624, p. 144;
German Agency Takes Dim View of Monopoly in Garbage Collection, 65 Antitrust and Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA), Oct.
7, 1993, no. 1634, at 478.
Packaging Waste EUR. REP., supra note 73.
• Commission to Take Germany to Court Over Packaging Law, Paleokrassas Says, INT'L
ENV. DAILY (BNA), Mar. 1, 1994.
" Michael Rose and David Perchard, When Waste is not Wanted -Germany's Recycling
Legislation, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at 18.
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private parties also saw the risk that their own governments might be
pressured by green parties to adopt equivalent regulations. Some producers
favored packaging regulations as a means of lowering packaging costs. 8 Other
firms concluded that if packaging regulations would inevitably follow the
Dutch-German example, it was more useful to shape those regulations
positively rather than oppose them outright. The German experience showed
that the packaging regulations could be advantageous for some businesses, and
that consumers responded positively to reducing packaging waste.7 9
Second, as DSD exported packaging waste to dumps elsewhere in Europe, it
aggravated the waste problems of those countries, adding urgency to the call
for packaging regulation."0 Green parties gained support for packaging
regulations in response to the perception that Germany was exporting its waste
problems. Third, and most importantly, the large increase in the supply of
recycled waste material drove down the price of competing materials in other
countries and forced some competitors out of business.81 This was especially
true of French manufacturers and recyclers of paper and plastics.82 The
French Environment Minister Michel Barnier called on Germany to prohibit
the export of packaging waste to France and threatened to stop imports of
German waste if the Germans did not comply. In the Council, France asked
Germany to modify its recycling law, and Germany responded by offering to
open bilateral talks with the countries that had complained about the
disruptive effect of German waste exports on their own industries, which
included France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Ireland
and Luxembourg. 3 Even French recycling firms that benefitted from access to
subsidized German waste paper and plastic found it difficult to compete with
German recycling firms that enjoyed even greater access to subsidized waste
" Many firms have found that recycled material lowers production costs without compromising
quality or dependability of supply. David Biddle, Recycling for Profit: The New Green Business
Frontier, HARV Bus. REV., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 145.
11 Gerleen H. Braakman, President of the European Organization for Packaging and the
Environment, ("EUROPEN"), an association of large packaging firms, commented that
"reduction of the volume of packaging is no longer anti-marketing but rather pro-marketing."
EUROPEN favors packaging regulations, including the proposed EU Directive on Packaging
discussed below. EUROPEN argues that reducing the volume of packaging saves resources,
reduces costs and attracts consumers. See generally, Packaging Waste: Exclusive Interview with
Head of European Packaging Lobby, EUR. REP., Oct. 13, 1993, no. 1893.
80 In 1993, Germany exported more than one-half of the 400,000 tons of plastic it collected to
foreign landfills. Ariane Genillard, German Waste Recycling is Hit by Success, FIN TIMES, June
18, 1993, at 2.
81 E.g., Bronwen Maddox, Waste Mountains Prove Difficult to Conquer: The Lesson of a
German Recycling Scheme that came to Grief Through Overspill, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at 5
(reporting that several recycling firms in the UK went out of business due to German recycled
material sold in the UK); Packaging Waste, EUR. REP., supra note 73.
82 French collectors of waste paper claimed that subsidized German waste paper would drive
them out of business, costing 27,000 jobs in the industry. French Waste Paper Collectors Protest
at German Imports, THE REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 15, 1993.
88 France Threatens to Act Over German Packaging Waste Exports, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
June 29, 1993.
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material for recycling. The French recyclers wanted France to adopt a
comparable system to remain competitive with Germany.
Anticipating the disruptive effect that German waste imports would have on
French industry following the enactment of the German packaging ordinance,
the French Government adopted a Decree on Packaging Waste on April 1,
1992, which took effect as of January 1, 1993.84 The French decree endorsed
the strategy of "valorization," meaning the recovery of materials. Like the
German ordinance, the French decree required the producer, importer or
retailer of a product to be responsible to "take back" all used packaging.
Companies could either act individually or by establishing joint organizations.
The organizations required government approval and were subject to
regulation. The French decree required valorization of at least 50 percent of
all steel, aluminum, plastic and paper packaging and 60 percent of glass
packaging by 1997. It did not, however, set any numerical quota for recycling.
By 2003, the decree would require the recovery of 75 percent of all packaging.
No more than one-quarter of that amount could be incinerated. 5 The decree
differed from the German law in three respects: First, unlike the German law,
the French did not require private parties to collect and sort packaging waste,
leaving that responsibility to the local sanitation agencies. Second, unlike the
German law, the French decree included energy recovery by incineration as an
acceptable alternative to disposal. Third, the French law set no specific targets
for recycling, re-use or incineration. Instead, it provided for broad objectives
and continuous monitoring of progress.
Pursuant to the decree, the French Government in cooperation with private
producers, retailers and importers established a "blue-dot" program
comparable to DSD's "green-dot" program. "Eco-Emballage," a consortium
of private industry was formed to operate the valorization program.
Participants in Eco-Emballage were required to pay an initial fee of FF50,000
(US$8,600) plus approximately one centime per packaged unit introduced into
the French market. The fee collected by the French Government would
finance the collection, sorting and delivery of recyclable packaging waste to
French companies for re-use, recycling or incineration.86 Approximately one-
half of French households participated in pilot waste recovery and sorting
programs established by Eco-Emballage by July 1993. Each community
establishing a pilot program was funded by Eco-Emballage8 Most French
' Decree 92.377, Article 4, of April 1, 1992, provides in relevant part: "Any producer, any
importer ... any person responsible for first placing on the market goods sold in packaging...
shall be required to contribute to or to provide for the disposal of all his packaging waste..."
11 French Legislation Shakes up Industry, 46 CANADIAN PACKAGING, Sept. 1993, no. 9, at 9
[hereinafter CANADIAN PACKAGING].
86 As of August 1993, more than 2,500 firms belonged to Eco-Emballage, paying over FF250
million (US$43 million) in fees. It was expected that more than FF2.5 billion (US$430 million)
eventually might be needed annually. French Legislation Shakes up Industry, CANADIAN
PACKAGING, supra note 85, at 9.
" French Packaging Waste Group Will Not Raise Subscription Fees in 1994, Int'l Env. Daily
(BNA), August 6, 1993.
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companies and foreign importers are expected eventually to join Eco-
Emballage, which will be responsible for all packaging waste, except plastics.
French plastic manufacturers have independently established a consortium,
"Valorplast," to facilitate plastic recycling so as to better compete with the
German plastics manufacturers. By 1993, more than 1,200 French firms were
participating. 88 Due to limited capacity, the amount of plastic to be recycled
was initially limited to 40,000 metric tons annually.89 Valorplast has focused
its collection efforts on France's five-billion bottles of mineral water consumed
annually, which constitute about 25 percent of the plastic waste generated
annually in France.90 By 1996, Valorplast hopes to recover one-fifth of these,
totalling 40,000 tons of plastic. Valorplast's 1994 annual budget is
approximately FF40 million (US$7 million), raised from industry fees and
contributions from Eco-Emballage. Four specialized organizations of
Valorplast will recycle different kinds of plastics into polyvinyl chloride
bottles, padding for textiles and outdoor furniture, among other things.91
Lightweight plastics that cannot be recycled, such as plastic bags and plastic
wrap, will be incinerated for energy recovery.92 Valorplast projects that its
approach to recovering large quantities of plastics and incinerating others will
lead to higher recovery levels at one-fifth the cost of the DSD.93
In 1994, the French Government proposed additional legislation requiring
all industrial and commercial businesses whose weekly production of waste
packaging exceeded 1,100 liters to re-use or recycle the materials either on
their own, through an approved processor or through a third party engaged in
the transport and trade of waste packaging, such as Eco-Emballage.94
iv. Belgium
Even prior to the German and Dutch recycling programs, waste exports to
Belgian landfills were a cause of concern to Belgium. 5 Following the adoption
88 Creation of Recovery Organization Announced by French Plastic Manufacturers, Int'l Env.
Daily (BNA), April 1, 1993 [hereinafter Creation, BNA].
10 Ralph Back, UIC Calls for Halt to Environmental Legislation Program, CHEMICAL WEEK,
October 13, 1993, at 22.
80 French Plastics Recyclers Set Target, CHEMICAL WEEK, Jan. 26, 1994, at 8.
81 French Plastics Industry Stars Packaging Recycling Program, 4 Bus & ENV'T, no. 4, Apr.
1993.
2 Creation (BNA) supra note 88.
03 Nancy Russotto, The Environmental Battlefield, CHEMISTRY AND INDUSTRY, no. 16, Aug.
16, 1993, at 644.
9' Alerts & Updates: France's Packaging Waste Bill, Bus. EUR, Apr. 4, 1994.
96 One response to the influx of foreign waste was the adoption of a ban on all foreign waste by
the Walloon regional Executive in 1983. The Wallonia ban was challenged by the Commission as
an obstacle to free movement of goods in violation of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty and as
inconsistent with Directives 75/442 on waste management and 84/631 on the supervision and
control of the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste. The Commission initiated an Article 169
enforcement proceeding. Commission v. Belgium, 9 July 1992, Case C-2/90. The European Court
held first that waste was a "good" subject to the free movement provisions of Article 30. The
Court, however, upheld the Wallonia ordinance in a narrowly reasoned judgment that the
restriction could be justified and was non-discriminating on the basis of the nature of the waste
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of the Tbpfer law, political pressure increased for Belgium to act. The
Government of Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene needed the support of the
French-speaking Ecolo (green) parties to enact the federal constitutional
reforms agreed to in February 1993. The price for the green parties' support
was the adoption of an eco-tax on packaging and selected disposable consumer
items produced from virgin materials, such as disposable cameras and razors.
Prime Minister Dehaene agreed to the adoption of the eco-tax, which was
enacted in August 1993, over the opposition of industry and commercial
interests.9"
The eco-tax, which is intended to take effect in 1995, would range from
BFrlO to 20 (27 to 54 cents) per item depending on the type of material and
weight.9 7 The tax charged to the customer is intended to encourage consumers
to use more recycled material. The law establishes minimum targets for the
use of recycled goods, and if a seller failed to meet these targets, certain of its
goods would be subject to the eco-tax. If, for example, the law requires that 60
percent of beverage containers in a store's stock must be made from recycled
material and only 40 percent are, all beverage containers sold at that store
would be subject to the eco-tax.
Plastic producers in Belgium and France claimed that the tax discriminates
against polyvinyl chloride plastics. There was also some doubt expressed by,
for example, French water producers like Evian, as to whether it would create
a barrier to free movement. As a result of this concern, Belgian retailers,
packagers and producers joined with importers to form an alternative to the
eco-tax known as "Fost Plus". Fost Plus, an industry consortium modelled on
DSD and Eco-Emballage, sought an exemption from the eco-tax for producers
that agreed to take back their products for re-use and recycling. Participating
companies in Fost Plus pay a fee to the government to establish a privatized
system for packaging collection, sorting and recovery."' Fost Plus, which
began operating in January 1994, hoped to establish reciprocal treatment for
its members' packaging waste with DSD and Eco-Emballage.
v. Denmark
Denmark banned non-refillable soft drink containers in 1971 and established
the first comprehensive system of recycling in the Community in 1978
prohibited, even though the ban expressly excluded all foreign waste, regardless of the type of
waste. The Court struck down the ban as it applied to hazardous waste products, which were
covered by Directive 84/631. See generally, Peter von Wilmowsky, Waste Disposal in the
Internal Market: The State of Play After the ECI's Ruling on the Walloon Import Ban, 30
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 541 (1993); L. Hancher, H. Sevenster, Case C-2/90, Commission v.
Belgium, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 351 (1993)
" Belgium Enacts Experimental 'Eco-Tax' on Disposable Goods, 19 WORLD ENVT'L. REP.
Aug. 6, 1993, no. 16.
"' Special Act of July 16, 1993, Concerning the Achievement of the Federalization of the State,
Article 369 et seq., Belgium Stat. The eco-taw was delayed pending the final approval of the EU
Directive.
98 Hilary Clarke, Survey of Belgium, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 1993, p. 10.
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providing for the public municipal collection of recyclables from households
and businesses."9 Denmark also established a deposit-and-return system to
encourage consumers' participation. 10 In June 1993, Denmark amended its
environmental law by authorizing the minister of the environment to issue
regulations requiring consumers to return certain products and packaging to
producers or importers and requiring those firms to bear the costs of recycling
or disposal. 10' The environment minister was further authorized to impose
administrative fines for non-compliance with the regulations.
The Danish Government has set a target for the year 2000 of reducing
packaging waste by 15 percent and increasing recycling to 75 percent of
beverage containers and 80 percent of all packaging materials. The
Government has also reached a voluntary agreement with industry, like the
Dutch Covenant, to reach 80 percent recycling of transport packaging by
1995.102
The Danish model places an equal responsibility on consumers, producers
and packagers to recycle, whereas the German law relies on the voluntary
participation of consumers. Presently, it is unclear the extent to which Danish
producers and packagers will follow the model of the DSD and Eco-
Emballage. In the politics of the European Union, Denmark has been a
leading voice for establishing a strict standard for recycling packaging and for
allowing Member States to exceed those standards. Denmark opposed the EU
Directive on Packaging as adopted, fearing that it would lower Danish
national standards. In conjunction with the Netherlands and Germany,
Denmark has established an important alliance for packaging regulation
within the Council.
vi. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has been relatively slow in responding to the
packaging waste problem. The Conservative government has looked to private
industry for direction in this area, and the industry has been divided over the
appropriate strategies for reducing packaging at its source, recovering waste
" Lov om Genanvendelse af Papir og Drikkevare-emballager samt Begrxnsning af Affald, lov
nr. 297, Lovtidende 851 (1978) [Law on the Recycling of Paper and Beverage Containers, and the
Reduction of Waste].
100 A 1981 Danish law imposed a compulsory deposit-and-return system for certain beverage
containers. Non-conforming containers were prohibited, including beer cans, which prevented
U.K. beer from being sold in Denmark. The Commission objected to the law, and in 1984, the law
was amended to allow the distribution of certain kinds of beverage containers that were non-
conforming, provided that the quantity did not exceed 3,000 hi annually. In its Danish Bottle
judgment, the European Court held that the protection of the environment was a mandatory
requirement which may limit the application of Article 30, and that a deposit-and-return scheme
was not disproportionate. However, the Court found that by restricting the quantity of beverages
sold in non-conforming containers, Denmark had violated Article 30. See Danish Bottle, supra
note 43.
10 Lov om PEndring af Lov om Miljebeskyttelse, Lov nr. 477, Lovtidende 2523 (1993),
[Amendment to Environmental Protection Law].
102 See EIU Special Report, supra note 50, at 21.
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and financing the transport, sorting and handling of packaging waste. As early
as 1990, a Government White Paper called for a national target of recovering
50 percent of all waste by 2000. Following the adoption of the German law,
the flood of subsidized packaging waste and recycled material from Germany
threatened the British paper, plastics and recycling industries. Beginning in
1991, the British Government set up an Ad Hoc Group on Packaging to
formulate an action plan with the participation of industry. Industry was at
least partly motivated by concern the government might otherwise impose a
mandatory scheme as other Member States and the Commission began
drafting and implementing their own systems for recovering packaging
waste.108 Industry and government tried repeatedly and failed to reach
consensus on a plan of action. 104 As discussions dragged on, industry and
political leaders sounded the alarm: British manufacturers were threatened;
the fledgling recycling industry could collapse under the weight of subsidized
recycled material from Germany. 0 5  Environmental concerns were
overshadowed by the threat of foreign economic competitors.
In 1993, the British Government requested proposals from the Producer
Responsibility Industry Group on a staged plan to recover at least 50 percent
of packaging waste by year 2000. The report, delivered in February 1994,
provided for a comprehensive system of recycling modelled on the French Eco-
Emballage. The primary responsibility for collecting and sorting household
packaging waste would remain with local authorities, but industry would
establish a consortium, "VALPAK", to finance and implement the recovery of
waste materials. The plan would rely upon the government to require all
private producers, packagers and retailers to participate. Government would
collect a fee from packagers and/or producers and importers or a tax on all
packaged goods. The plan would cost about 200 million pounds annually,
which is less than one-tenth of the cost of operating the DSD in 1993.
Industry leaders remain divided over the plan, and the government has not yet
introduced legislation.0 6 The uncertain direction of the British recycling
"I Ron Goddard, Tight Schedule for Action Plan on Waste; British Government's Plan to
Reduce Packaging Waste, PACKAGING WEEK, Feb. 12, 1992.
104 Maddox, supra note 81, at 5.
For example, the technical director of the Industry Council for Packaging and the
Environment (INCPEN), Jane Bickerstaffe, warned that "Several recycling firms have gone out
of business in this country in the past six months because German waste is offered here." Maddox,
supra note 81, at 5. The Economist reported that "the British government has been lobbied by
increasingly frantic waste-paper merchants and plastics recyclers protesting that their markets are
being destroyed by the backwash of German rubbish." Environment Survey, THE EcONOMIST,
May 29, 1993, at 12, 14; EUR, ENERGY, supra note 73. The British first secretary for the
environment in the U.K. embassy in Germany said, "Germany's waste policies are effectively
killing other European recycling schemes which assume that there is a positive price for used
packaging." Genillard, supra note ?, at 6.
"00 Producer Responsibility Industry Group, Real Value from Packaging Waste: A Way
Forward. (A report for public consultation presented to the Secretary of State of the Environment
and the President of the Board of Trade) 7 Feb. 1994; Charles Clover, Shoppers' Levy Planned to
Fund Recycling, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 8, 1994, p. 2.
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program has also been reflected in an ambivalent attitude toward the proposed
EU packaging directive, as discussed below.
vii. Italy
Unlike other European governments that have concentrated their legislative
efforts on increasing the supply of recycled material, Italy created both
demand for, and supply of, recycled material. Legislation requiring that
packaging be made from recycled materials was introduced in the early
1980's. Industry opposition successfully stopped numerous legislative programs
from taking effect. In 1988, the Italian Parliament mandated recycling and
required producers and packagers to join a consortium to facilitate
recycling. 10 7  Four private recycling consortia have been formed, each
responsible for recycling different packaging materials. The consortia are
financed by a levy on packaging and cooperate with local authorities in the
collection and sorting of material. For example, Replastic, which is the
consortium responsible for all plastic resins, pays subsidies per household to
the local authorities for collecting plastic containers separately. 0 8 About 40
percent of plastics and 50 percent of glass and metals were recycled by 1993.
Since January 1, 1991, Italy has required that all paper materials used for
packaging must be made from recycled fibers. By 1993, almost 90 percent of
all paper packaging was derived from recycled material. Partly in response to
the market disruptions caused by DSD, broad political support has emerged in
Italy for the basic framework of the Italian recycling program. Numerous
reforms have been proposed to widen its scope or to make it more flexible. 0 9
Italy's packaging scheme conforms closely to the proposed EU packaging
directive, and Italy has been a consistent supporter of the directive.
viii. Conclusion
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands adopted packaging regulations to
manage their national solid waste problem. Public power was exercised over
private producers and consumers engaged in producing and disposing of
packaging waste. According to the regulatory competition model, we might
expect private parties subject to regulation to shift their consumption and
production to other jurisdictions without such regulation. Instead, consumers
and producers in unregulated jurisdictions, including France, the UK, Belgium
and Italy, lobbied for the adoption of equivalent national laws. Indeed,
competition among private packaging companies and recyclers of waste forced
107 Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 9 settembre 1988, n. 397, recante
disposizioni urgenti in materia di smahimento dei rifluti industriali, Gazzetta Officale Della
Republica Italiana Nov. 10, 1988, [Law 475 of November 9, 1988]. The EIU Special Report,
supra note 50, at 16-17.
108 Replastic Agrees to Pay Part of Costs for Local Authorities to Collect Plastics, INT'L ENV
DAILY (BNA), Feb. 25, 1993.
109 Parliament to Consider Major Overhaul of Waste Disposal, Treatment Provisions, INT'L
ENV. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 24, 1992.
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foreign competitors to support regulation. Rather than behaving
autonomously, market actors constructively engaged state authorities to raise
regulatory standards.
There is an irony to the interaction of market and state actors raising
national measures: these national measures are themselves seen as potentially
distorting the EU market. Some market actors, non-Member States and the
Commission have viewed national regulations to minimize packaging and
require recycling of packaging waste as disruptions to the single market. Must
a Portuguese company redesign its packaging for the Dutch market? Must a
U.S. firm join DSD or take-back its own packaging in the German market?
Must a company redesign its packages for 12 different national markets?
Industry groups, member state governments, foreign firms and the
Commission have all expressed concern about the need to harmonize national
packaging regulations to avoid such distortions."' These concerns led to
proposals in 1991 for an EU directive on packaging.
C. EU Directive on Packaging
The Council and Parliament adopted the directive on packaging and
packaging waste on December 20, 1994.111 The directive aims to harmonize
national measures under Article 100a. The directive requires the recovery of
50-65 percent, by weight, of all packaging waste within five years. 1 2 Recovery
includes the re-use of packaging, recycling of waste materials and recovery of
energy through incineration. Within this general recovery target, the directive
requires recycling of 25-45 percent of packaging waste, including at least 15
percent of each type of packaging material."' The directive prohibits national
requirements for recycling more than 45 percent of packaging waste, which
conflicts with existing laws in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. The
Directive permits Member States to maintain higher standards if the
Commission confirms that these higher standards are consistent with
.10 For example, the European Plastic Association called on the Community to adopt a
Community-wide program of mandatory recycling to create a level playing field for plastic
manufacturers outside Germany. Mary Murphy and Ron Goddard, Concessions Hope for EC
Packaging Directive, 7 PACKAGING WEEK, no. 38, March 11, 1992, at 1; David Gardner, Quentin
Peel and John Hunt, Green Germany Drags Brussels into Environmental Arena, FIN TIMES, Jan.
24, 1992, at 2; Packaging: Community Regulation in the Pipeline, EUR REP, July 3, 1991, no.
1690, p. 1; John Thornhill, Repackaged, Recycled, Restricted, FIN TIMES, Dec. 6, 1991, p. 17.
. European Parliament and Council Directive on packaging and packaging waste on 20
December, 1994, 94/62/EC [hereinafter Directive]. Under the co-decision procedure, the
European Parliament adopted the Council's common position on May 4, 1994, with relatively
minor amendments after rejecting a large number of green amendments to strengthen the
directive. The Commission adopted all the Parliament's amendments on May 25. The Council of
Environment Ministers failed to reach agreement on June 9 over the objections of Belgium,
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Under the Maastricht Treaty's conciliation procedure,
representatives of Parliament and the Council reached agreement i December 1994, and the
Directive was adopted by both Parliament and a meeting of the Council on December 20.




environmental protection, avoid distortions to the internal market, do not
hinder compliance by other Member States and do not constitute an arbitrary
means of discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade within the EU.
Recognizing the difficulty of transportation and the low level of packaging
waste per capita in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the directive provides that
these Member States are only required to recover the 25 percent of their
packaging waste within five years and are not expected to meet the full
requirements of the directive until year 2005.114
After the initial stage, the Commission would review the waste situation and
recommend appropriate levels of recovery and recycling, and within ten years
the Council will substantially increase targets for recovery and recycling. The
directive requires Member States to ensure that systems are set up to provide
for the return of all used packaging, including all imported products under
nondiscriminatory conditions and to ensure that packaging waste is effectively
recovered.116 Such systems are required to provide for industry participation.
To facilitate recovery, the directive requires Member States to institute within
five years a system of marking on all packaging indicating whether the
packaging is reusable or recoverable. 1 6 In addition, the directive requires
Member States to provide information on packaging waste to enable the
Commission to adopt effective waste management policies" 7 and consumer
education on the advantages of reusable and recoverable packaging."' The
directive leaves to Member States the choice of instrument for the attainment
of the recovery targets, and it allows Member States to adopt economic
instruments, including eco-taxes, subject to the adoption of an eco-tax by the
Council.' It prohibits Member States from impeding the marketing of any
packaging that satisfies the directive.120 Finally, the directive requires all
Member States to implement preventive measures to minimize packaging
waste '2 and to ensure that within three years all packaging complies with
certain essential requirements on composition and design specified in Annex II
of the directive.
1 22
The directive has been criticized by some Member States, environmentalists
and consumer groups as inadequate and preferential to industry in numerous
"I Directive, Article 6.
"' Directive, Article 7.
1"6 Directive, Article 8.
17 Directive, Article 12.
"8 Directive, Article 13.
"I Directive, Article 15. The original text of the directive would have authorized Member
States to use "economic instruments" (such as eco-taxes or fees) so long as they did not conflict
with Council measures, distort competition, create obstacles to trade, impose disproportionate
burdens, or discriminate against particular products. During the second reading, the Parliament
amended the proposed directive to call on the adoption of uniform economic instruments by the
Council. This amendment became a principle point of contention in the Council and required a
conciliation procedure.
120 Directive, Article 18.
121 Directive, Article 4.
122 Directive, Article 9.
1994/95]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
respects. First, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands favored the adoption
of a strict hierarchy of recovery methods that would restrict incineration as a
method of last resort. Other countries preferred incineration as more cost
effective than recycling.' 28 Second, Belgium objected to the Parliament's
amendment calling for the adoption of economic instruments, including eco-
taxes, by the Council. Belgium was concerned that the EU eco-taxes would
displace the national eco-taxes to be levied on non-recyclable packaging and
products in Belgium."" This provision was changed during the conciliation
procedure to permit Belgium to levy eco-taxes. Third, Denmark, Germany and
the Netherlands, as well as the Greens, expressed concern that the
Commission could compel them to lower existing standards to comply with the
harmonized standard. 25 It is unclear whether the Commission will in fact
require Member States to reduce higher standards. " Fourth, the Benelux
countries, Germany and the Greens generally complain that the directive
would give countries too much discretion in certain respects.' 27
12 The Commission argued that the appropriateness of requiring refillable containers or
recycling or heat generation depends upon the availability of water and alternative energy sources
and the cost of transporting refillable containers back to the place of manufacture. For example,
France has invested heavily in incineration for energy generation. Environment Official Denounces
Calls for Environmental Rule Moratorium, INT'L ENV. DAILY (BNA), Oct. 18, 1993.
12 As Council President, Belgium had strongly supported the proposed directive, but following
the European Parliament's amendments, domestic political opposition forced the Belgian
Government to withhold its support in the Council. Belgian Ministers to Consider Compromise
Text, THE REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 9, 1994; Belgium Forces Conciliation for
Packaging Directive, THE REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP, June 8, 1994.
225 Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands argued unsuccessfully that under the Maastricht
Treaty, environmental concerns take priority over harmonization. The Dutch Environment
Minister Hans Alders described the maximum limits on recovery of packaging waste as
"ridiculous" and argued that if it takes effect "We'll have to drop 35-40 percent of recycled glass
in landfill." Divided EU Agrees on Packaging Directive, INT'L ENV. DAILY (BNA), Jan. 11, 1994.
The proposed directive had imposed uniform targets for the first five years for recovery and
recycling of 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively, and for ten years, 90 percent and 60 percent,
respectively. Under the Belgian presidency, the Council decided to amend these uniform targets
with a range that would allow Member States to take into consideration their special
circumstances. However, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands already have legislated
standards in excess of the high range permitted by the directive. This led to the adoption of
Article 6, allowing higher standards subject to the Commission's approval.
... Article 100a(4) of the Treaty provides that if a member state deems it necessary to apply
national measures to protect the environment which do not conform to a harmonization measure,
the member state must inform the Commission which "shall confirm the provisions involved after
having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States." Arguably, the Commission would have no discretion to refuse to
confirm the packaging regulations adopted by Germany or Denmark merely because they deviate
from the proposed directive. The Court has recently ruled that in applying Article 100a(4) the
Commission must give a clear statement of its reasons as to why a derogation should be permitted.
France v. Commission, C41/93, May 17, 1994, (annulling a Commission decision allowing
Germany to impose tighter restrictions on pentachlorophenol in certain products than were
permitted by Directive 76/769/EEC on the harmonization of laws concerning certain dangerous
substances).
... For example, some wanted the directive to require producers to be responsible for collecting
and recovering waste either by charging a deposit or arranging for collection at the point of sale or
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Though the directive was adopted by a qualified majority of the Council, it
remains controversial. Some Greens bitterly criticize the directive as a sellout
to industry. 128 It is true that industry aggressively lobbied the Parliament to
stop the efforts of the Greens to tighten the directive and has responded
positively to the directive's adoption,2 9 and that there is a risk that packaging
regulations may be weakened by the Commission if it determines that these
requirements distort competition or obstruct the internal market. It is
tempting to describe this debate as one more example in which the regulatory
authority was captured by industry. One could also point out that
paradoxically while market competition led to higher regulatory standards
among EU members, the intervention of the EU may ultimately lower
requirements for recycling. It is equally true that for at least Ireland, Greece,
Portugal, Spain and the UK, the adoption of the directive will raise regulatory
standards significantly, and that the assertion of a legitimate EU interest in
the waste problem generally opens the way for future regulation. Moreover,
the adoption of an EU packaging directive will have a powerful demonstration
effect on countries outside the EU, including the United States, that must
adapt their exports to meet EU packaging and marketing standards.
The point of this discussion, however, is not to debate the merits of the EU
directive, but rather to show how the interaction of Member States, EU
technocrats, Greens and industry led to a different outcome than the
conventional paradigm of a race-to-the-bottom would anticipate. The
movement of capital from high-regulatory jurisdictions to low-regulatory
jurisdictions was not the decisive force in the outcome of this debate. In
actuality, the relationships of public and private, municipal and international,
consumers and producers, workers and investors, technocrats and politicians,
were more complex and less predictable than regulatory competition theory
takes into account.
Several factors might explain why packaging waste regulations expanded
throughout the EU. Certainly, one factor was that the regulations were
implemented at the point of consumption rather than at the point of
production, so that all producers selling in the same market were subject to
the same requirements and could not opt out of them. Another factor was that
the regulation conferred certain benefits on some producers, namely recyclers
and some packagers, who then had an interest in supporting such regulation.
A third factor was that the packaging and recycling industries were able to
pass the costs of regulation on to consumers without fear of foreign
competition, and fourth, consumers were willing to pay the costs of such
establishing a consortium of European producers to collect and recover waste. Others wanted the
directive to provide for minimum levels of re-use of packaging.
128 See, e.g., Packaging Waste: Parliament Backs Council Position with a 'Disappointing'
Vote, EUR. ENV'T, no. 432, May 17, 1994; Greenpeace Accuses Belgium of Sabotaging
'Packaging' Directive, EUR ENV'T, no. 422, Dec. 14, 1993; Greenpeace Criticizes Belgian Push on
Packaging Directive, THE REUTER EUR, COMMUNITY REP, Nov. 30, 1993.
129 E.g., ACE Applauds EU Packaging Directive Position, EUR. ENV'T, March 31, 1994, no.
429.
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regulation because of a high level of green consciousness. Finally, the
opportunity of green parties and organizations to participate in the democratic
process created a powerful voice in favor of increased regulation.
III. THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PARTIES
This description of the interaction of public and private parties in the
legislative processes in the Member States boldly contradicts the conventional
assumptions that market actors engaged in free trade drive down regulatory
standards. The Dutch and German packaging programs triggered a reaction in
other EU Member States based on both political and economic considerations.
In every case where packaging regulations have been proposed, the state has
relied upon industry in their formulation and implementation. In France, the
UK, and Belgium, industry has been crucial in lobbying for the packaging
laws. And industry has generally been supportive of packaging regulations
where they have been enacted. Contrary to the conventional paradigm of a
race-to-the-bottom, private actors engaged in international markets have been
integral to raising national regulatory standards.
The interaction of public and private parties in regulatory competition
challenges our preconceptions of the relationship between the state and the
market in the same way that the legal realists' attack on the public/private
distinction challenged the preconception of a "normal price" on which our
unfair trade laws are premised. Both the environmentalist critic of free trade
and the cosmopolitan free-trade proponent derive their core beliefs in
regulatory competition and fair trade, respectively, from the premise that the
market and the state are autonomous, rational and homogenous actors. The
evidence that the state both relies upon market actors in formulating and
implementing regulation and the evidence that the market itself operates
within the penumbra of state power rebuts the presumption of the autonomy
of the state and the market.
The state's interference in the market and the market's engagement in the
state call into question the false premise of the market's autonomy. More to
the point, they cast doubt on our understanding about the relationship of the
state and the market and its consequences for economic integration.
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